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 Law and Economics courses taught in law schools are sometimes criticized 
for inadequately explaining the normative criterion of “economic efficiency” and 
then applying this criterion throughout the course in a superficial and biased 
manner that pejoratively labels most governmental market interventions and wealth 
redistribution measures as inefficient.  These criticisms have merit, and in this brief 
article I point out a number of conceptual problems, empirical difficulties and 
normative shortcomings of the economic efficiency criterion that students need to 
understand in order to later in their careers be able to effectively counter policy 
arguments that rest upon efficiency assessments.   
The eight specific shortcomings of the economic efficiency criterion that I 
address in this brief essay are the pervasiveness of severe data limitations that 
render efficiency assessments unreliable, the lack of clarity as to whether 
willingness to pay should be measured by offer prices or instead by asking prices, 
the difficulty of obtaining honest and accurate responses as to willingness to pay 
from the persons surveyed, uncertainty as to the appropriate discount rate that 
should be used for discounting future policy consequences, the problem posed by 
endogenous preferences, the problem posed by the often-overlooked “problem of 
person-altering consequences,” the problematic nature of using willingness to pay 
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as a measure of social value, and finally, the problematic nature of using a 



























II. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CRITERION DEFINED 
 
III. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MEASURING WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
A. Sampling Limitations. 
 
B. Determining Whether to Use Offer Prices or Instead Asking Prices to 
Measure Willingness to Pay. 
 
C. Obtaining Honest and Accurate Responses. 
 
D. Determining the Appropriate Discount Rate.  
 
E. Valuing Policy Impacts When Preferences are Exogenous. 
 
F. Valuing Policy Impacts in Light of the Person-Altering Consequences 
of Policies. 
 














 courses taught in law schools are sometimes criticized 
for inadequately explaining and then summarily endorsing the use of the normative 
criterion of “economic efficiency”3 to evaluate policies, and then applying this 
criterion in a superficial and unreflective manner to pejoratively label most 
governmental market interventions and wealth redistribution measures as 
inefficient.  Those critics argue that the efficiency criterion is not well defined in 
significant regards and thus allows for result-oriented manipulation by analysts, 
and that it is also often difficult or impossible to obtain sufficiently reliable data to 
be able to meaningfully apply the criterion, and that in addition the criterion has a 
pronounced bias in favor of the interests of the wealthiest members of society and 
does not accord any respect to rights.  They also argue that these severe 
shortcomings of the criterion are not made sufficiently clear to students to enable 
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them in their later studies and careers to effectively counter policy 
recommendations that are based upon efficiency assessments.   
There is considerable merit to these arguments, and it is also troubling that 
much of the early advocacy and financial support provided for the introduction of 
Law and Economics courses into law school curricula, as well as the related 
advocacy for the broader use of the efficiency criterion in legislative, regulatory 
and judicial decision-making, has been shown to be due directly or indirectly to the 
efforts of certain wealthy individuals who embraced a pronounced right-wing 
libertarian political orientation, and whose large financial interests would be 
furthered by a more widespread and uncritical embrace of the efficiency criterion.
4
  
The fact that several ideologically-oriented foundations established by these 
individuals provided much of the financial support for many law schools’ Law and 





 suggests that this insufficiently critical embrace of the 
efficiency criterion that often characterizes these courses and workshops may have 
been intentional, at least in some instances. 
These powerful criticisms call conventional Law and Economics courses 
into some question.  However, in my opinion these criticisms can be adequately 
addressed through relatively modest pedagogical changes and do not justify the 
more radical measure of eliminating these otherwise useful classes from law school 
curricula.  My experience in teaching these courses for over 25 years is that it is 
possible to provide law students with a succinct yet comprehensive introduction to 
the concept of economic efficiency that does not only explain the concept and alert 
students to its current widespread application in policy analysis, but that also helps 
them to understand the numerous and severe conceptual, empirical and normative 
shortcomings of that criterion.   
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It is critically important for teachers of Law and Economics courses to 
explain the important concept of economic efficiency in some detail at the outset 
so that the students will then have an understanding as to why efficiency 
assessments of policies are in general useless or even positively misleading, so that 
in their later careers they will be better able to respond effectively to policy 
arguments based on such efficiency assessments.  In this brief essay I will attempt 
to clarify the conceptual and empirical difficulties that are encountered when 
attempting to assess of the efficiency or inefficiency of a particular policy, and 
what is normatively problematic about using this criterion as an evaluative 
standard even if these measurement difficulties can somehow be overcome.   
 
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CRITERION DEFINED  
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 “Efficiency” is a protean term that means different things in different 
contexts.  The particular concept of efficiency that is generally applied in assessing 
the economic consequences of policies is what economists more precisely call 
“Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.”6 The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion has a 
straightforward and intuitively appealing definition.  If the aggregate benefits of a 
policy to those persons favorably impacted by it, as measured by their willingness 
to pay for those benefits if they were required to do so, exceeds the aggregate costs 
of that policy imposed upon those persons unfavorably impacted by it, again as 
measured by their willingness to pay if required to do so to avoid those costs, the 
policy is then regarded as a “Kaldor-Hicks improvement,” and is often more 
colloquially described as simply being “efficient” or as “resulting in an increase in 
social wealth.”  There is no additional requirement that compensation be paid by 
the policy’s beneficiaries to those persons burdened in order for that policy to be a 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement, it is sufficient if the aggregate benefits exceed the 
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aggregate costs.  If a resource allocation is reached where no further Kaldor-Hicks 
improvements are possible then that allocation is described as being “Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient,” or, equivalently, as being “efficient” or “wealth maximizing” relative to 
any other possible allocation of resources.   
 The most straightforward application of this criterion, one that is usually 
presented early on in Law and Economics courses to illustrate the underlying 
concepts, is to conduct a geometric analysis of the efficiency of various forms of 
governmental intervention into a hypothetical free market that satisfies the 
behavioral and institutional assumptions for perfect competition.   Using a simple 
supply-and-demand graph depicting such a market in competitive equilibrium, the 
aggregate benefits to the buyers of the good or service of the existence of such a 
market can be shown to be the size of the triangle
7
  under the demand curve and 
above the equilibrium price line.  This area represents the aggregate willingness to 
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pay of those persons who buy in this market over and above the lower market 
equilibrium price they are required to pay for the good or service.  Each of these 
buyers will obtain a benefit from their purchase equal to the difference between 
their personal “reservation price” for the good or service8 and its equilibrium price.  
The aggregate benefit to all of these buyers is referred to as the “consumer surplus” 
generated by this market.   
In similar fashion, the aggregate benefits to the sellers of the existence of 
this market can be shown by the size of the triangle
9
 above the marginal cost-based 
supply curve and below the equilibrium price line, with each of these sellers 
obtaining a benefit from their sale equal to the difference between their personal 
reservation price for the good or service
10
 and its equilibrium price.  The aggregate 
benefit to all of these sellers is referred to as the “producer surplus” generated by 
this market.  It is then geometrically demonstrated to students that various forms of 
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governmental intervention into the operation of this market that go beyond the 
simple background enforcement of property rights and contractual obligations and 
restrictions upon collusion – for example, measures such as the imposition of price 
ceilings, price floors, sales taxes, income or payroll taxes, subsidies to buyers 
and/or sellers, or the allowance of collusion among buyers or sellers – will 
generally reduce the combined consumer and producer surplus that the market 
generates.  Therefore such measures are usually judged to be inefficient. 
In similar fashion, it is easily demonstrated that under the willingness to pay 
valuation framework any transfer of wealth from one group of persons to another 
will have an aggregate cost to those persons burdened of that exact amount of 
wealth, an amount that is equal to its aggregate benefits to those persons benefitted.  
Since any transfer of wealth will in practice necessarily involve some transaction 
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costs in arranging and carrying out those wealth transfers, when those transaction 
costs are taken into account the redistribution of wealth will be inefficient.    
Now I do recognize that most if not all teachers of Law and Economics 
courses at about this point in the class will attempt to make clear to the students 
that not all markets satisfy the full range of perfectly competitive market 
assumptions that underlie these conclusions as to the general inefficiency of 
governmental interventions altering market outcomes.  They can and usually do 
demonstrate through use of the same basic supply-and-demand framework that 
there will be market failures when there are positive or negative externalities of 
production or consumption that are not captured by the supply or demand curves, 
or where sellers or buyers significantly depart from rational actor assumptions.  
Under such circumstances markets may well fail to reach efficient results, and 
appropriate governmental interventions may to some extent rectify these 
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inefficiencies.  But these important caveats as to the possible inefficiencies 
resulting from market failures are then often downplayed or even overlooked 
entirely later in the course when various laws are examined for their efficiency or 
inefficiency.  In addition, the points that I will discuss below regarding why the use 
of the efficiency criterion is problematic even in those contexts where all of the 
restrictive assumptions of perfect competition are satisfied and when all costs and 
benefits are internalized are generally covered inadequately, if at all.   
This simple framework of analysis demonstrating the general inefficiency of 
governmental interventions into perfectly competitive markets, absent market 
failures, and the inefficiency of governmental income or wealth redistribution 
measures, if not then developed in more detail so that the more subtle yet severe 
conceptual, empirical and normative limitations of the efficiency criterion are 
made clear, will tend to implicitly impart to students the general message that a 
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limited, laissez-faire government that provides a basic framework of law and order, 
but does that not otherwise interfere with market processes or redistribute market-
generated incomes, will better facilitate the general welfare than will a more 
interventionist government.  This simplistic, pro-free market orientation then often 
explicitly or implicitly suffuses the remainder of the course as various legal 
doctrines in property law, contract law, tort law, corporate governance, etc. are 
examined one after another for their efficiency or inefficiency. This repeated 
assessment of legal rules by an efficiency criterion whose conceptual and empirical 
shortcomings and problematic normative basis have not been first fully explained 
to students are what those persons who criticize these courses as biased in favor of 
the interests of the wealthiest members of society find most objectionable.             
Law and Economics courses do not have to be taught this way.  It is entirely 
possible for a teacher who is willing to devote a week or so of class coverage to the 
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important economic efficiency criterion to make clear to students its numerous 
shortcomings.  The students hopefully will then in their later studies and careers 
have a much greater capability to effectively refute arguments regarding a policy’s 
merits that rest upon efficiency or inefficiency premises. 
Let me briefly discuss the serious problems that are inherent in the use of the 
efficiency criterion to evaluate the merits of policies.  I will first address the 
substantial and arguably overwhelming conceptual and empirical difficulties that 
are involved in reaching a meaningful quantitative assessment of the efficiency or 
inefficiency of a policy.  I will then address the problematic implicit assumptions 
involved in using efficiency as a normative criterion for assessing policies even if 
one is somehow able to meaningfully quantify those policy impacts.            
III. PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MEASURING WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
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 The most severe problems that are commonly encountered in quantifying the 
willingness to pay-based impacts of a proposed policy measure are the following:  
1) the practical limitation that it is usually not possible to survey more than a 
modest-sized sample of the likely affected current population when measuring a 
proposed policy’s impacts, and that it is obviously impossible to survey those 
persons who will later be impacted by the policy but who are not yet born, 2) 
resolving the question of whether to measure the willingness to pay of the persons 
surveyed through their offer prices or instead through their asking prices, 3) the 
difficulty of obtaining honest and accurate measures of willingness to pay from 
those persons surveyed, 4) the problem of determining the appropriate discount 
rate to apply to future policy impacts before aggregating them with current 
impacts, 5) the problem posed by the possibility that the preferences of some or all 
of the persons impacted by a policy may be endogenous with respect to that policy, 
rather than stable and exogenously determined, and perhaps most intractably, 6) 
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the problem that one of the long-term impacts of any policy whatsoever is that it 
will eventually lead to a different genetic identity at the time of conception than 
would otherwise be created for all persons born thereafter through the end of 
eternity; i.e., it will eventually have universal “person-altering consequences” in 
that all of the persons who will later come into being after some period of time 
after the implementation of a policy will do so only because of the particular policy 
that was implemented, and these obviously momentous policy consequences for 
those persons will somehow have to be taken into account in valuing those 
impacts.  Let me briefly address each of these difficulties in turn.       
A.  Sampling Limitations. 
For the basic supply-and-demand market model commonly used to 
geometrically introduce the concept of economic efficiency in Law and Economics 
courses the reservation prices of all of the potential buyers and sellers are assumed 
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to be known and represented by the positions of the demand and supply curves, so 
that the problems of calculating the willingness to pay-based impacts of a 
governmental market intervention are reduced to simple matters of addition and 
subtraction.   For real-world attempts to assess the efficiency of policies, however, 
the willingness of the impacted persons to pay to experience (or to avoid) the 
consequences of the policies are not so given and will have to be empirically 
determined.   
In practice, unfortunately, whoever is directed to assess a policy’s efficiency 
or inefficiency is usually not given anywhere near the resources that would be 
necessary to survey even a substantial fraction of the living individuals who would 
be impacted to some extent by the policy, who may easily number in the millions 
for significant governmental policies, and of course the analyst will be unable to 
survey at all those persons who will eventually be impacted by the policy once 
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they come into existence, but who have not yet been born at the time that the 
policy’s impacts are being assessed.  The analyst will typically be limited to 
surveying the responses of at most a relatively small sample of the current 
population and then will have to make projections based upon those findings in 
order to estimate the aggregate willingness to pay of the entire impacted current 
population.  Based also on those sample survey findings the analyst will have to 
speculate as to how the affected members of future generations will regard the 
policy impacts, and then make willingness to pay estimates for those future persons 
accordingly.  With all of this projection and speculation from an often very small 
survey data base even if relatively sophisticated stratified sampling techniques are 
utilized to enhance the representativeness of the selected sample this will limit the 
confidence that one can have in these estimates.      
B. Determining Whether to Use Offer Prices or Instead Asking Prices to      
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Measure Willingness to Pay. 
The use of the simple phrase “willingness to pay” masks an important yet 
unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) issue in efficiency analysis.  When 
attempting to ascertain the willingness to pay of a person who is benefitted by a 
policy, is the proper question to pose how much the person would be willing to pay 
to receive those benefits – commonly referred to as their “offer price” for those 
benefits– or is the proper question instead how much that person would demand to 
give up those benefits once they had been conferred upon them – commonly 
referred to as their “asking price?”  Similarly, and more importantly, when 
attempting to ascertain the willingness to pay of a person who would be injured by 
a policy to avoid its costs, is the proper question to pose how much that person 
would be willing to pay to avoid the imposition of those costs – again their offer 
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price – or instead how much that person would demand for their consent to have 
those costs imposed upon them - their asking price?   
 Unfortunately, how the willingness to pay question is posed may 
significantly affect the answers obtained.  Depending on the framing of the 
question these answers may differ dramatically in size, particularly when 
attempting to measure the impacts of a policy on those persons for which the 
policy is perceived as imposing substantial costs.  The reason for this is that while 
a person’s offer price to avoid a policy’s costs is constrained by the amount of their 
wealth, and by what other objectives they have that they will want to use their 
wealth to satisfy, their asking price is not so constrained by their wealth and has no 
necessary upper limit.  If a person is highly reluctant to consent to implementation 
of a particular policy as a matter of principle then that person’s asking price for 
their consent could be very large, or even infinite in the sense that they might 
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refuse to give their consent to the policy’s implementation for any amount of 
money.
11
  An efficiency assessment of a policy will not provide meaningful 
guidance for to policymakers if there is an infinite cost included in the balance.      
An analyst conducting an efficiency analysis will have to choose whether to 
use offer prices or instead asking prices for their measurements of willingness to 
pay, or whether instead to use some combination of the two forms of measurement.  
The efficiency criterion would be more useful if there was a clearly correct choice 
here as to the proper questions to pose, so that analysts would not be able to 
covertly manipulate the questions in order to reach a result that they favored for 
other reasons.  But there does not appear to be a definitive resolution of this 
offer/asking price problem that is or can be incorporated into standard practice, 
given the vagueness of the general “willingness to pay” efficiency formulation.   
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One may choose to look to the operation of markets for some guidance here 
as to how to measure willingness to pay given that efficiency analysis is often 
regarded as an attempt to apply market-like assessment principles to evaluate 
governmental policies that primarily impact persons in non-market settings.  
Buyers in markets will pay no more than their offer prices for the benefits of 
having a good or service, and this fact suggests that offer prices are perhaps the 
most appropriate measures of willingness to pay, at least for policy beneficiaries.  
On the other hand, however, sellers do not have to part with their goods or services 
unless their asking prices are met, suggesting that asking prices may be the proper 
measure for valuing the costs imposed by policies.  So if efficiency analysis is to 
be done in a manner that closely emulates the workings of markets perhaps offer 
prices should be used to measure benefits and asking prices to measure costs.   
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In practice, however, almost all efficiency analyses
12
 use offer prices to 
measure both the benefits and costs of the policies being considered.  But this 
approach seems to be based primarily upon the desire of analysts to avoid the 
possibility of having the assessment skewed heavily against the policy in question 
by very large or even infinite asking prices that perhaps only a very small minority 
of the impacted persons would declare, rather than upon some credible theoretical 
argument as to why the impacted persons’ offer prices rather than their asking 
prices are the “correct” measure of a policy’s negative impacts.  This lack of clear 
direction as to how willingness to pay should be measured, and the possible 
sensitivity of the conclusions reached in an efficiency analysis with regard to how 
the willingness to pay question is posed, greatly undercuts the usefulness of the 
efficiency criterion as an objective measure of the merits of policies.    
C.  Obtaining Honest and Accurate Responses. 
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Even once an analyst one has determined the sample of the impacted 
population to survey, and has made their choice between using offer price or 
instead asking price measures of willingness to pay, there remains the question as 
to whether the responses obtained will honestly and  accurately reflect true 
willingness to pay.  There are several reasons why this may not be the case. 
First of all, the questions posed to respondents with regard to the impacts of 
a proposed policy are usually not the sort of questions that people are asked to 
answer on a regular basis and therefore have some experience to draw upon in 
responding.  Being asked how much one would be willing to pay, for example, for 
more stringent limits on the emission of certain toxic chemicals, or for a worldwide 
treaty banning blue whale hunting, or for a better freeway connection in a 
neighboring city that one occasionally visits by automobile are not like the normal 
routine shopping expenditure decisions that one makes every day.  People may 
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give answers to such unfamiliar hypothetical survey questions that are not very 
well considered, particularly since they are not subject to the discipline of actually 
having to pay the declared amounts for the benefits of the policy, or having to 
accept the declared compensation for its costs.  Economists generally favor on 
reliability grounds the use of “revealed preference” data that reflects actual 
spending behavior over merely hypothetical survey responses, but an efficiency 
analyst will unfortunately usually only have such hypothetical survey responses to 
work with. 
A second problem here is that some of the persons surveyed may 
deliberately misstate their willingness to pay for strategic reasons.  A person who 
would benefit from a policy has an incentive to overstate the size of this benefit in 
an attempt to make the policy’s implementation more likely, particularly since they 
will not be required to pay this stated sum.  Similarly, a person who would be 
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burdened by a policy has an incentive to overstate the size of this burden in an 
attempt to discourage the implementation of the policy.  On the other hand, the 
persons surveyed might be concerned that their responses might somehow provide 
a basis for later public assessments against (or compensation payments made to) 
them, which would encourage the beneficiaries to now understate the benefits, but 
would further encourage those persons burdened by the policy to further overstate 
those burdens.  All of these strategic considerations that may be in play will 
undercut the confidence an analyst can have in the accuracy of their efficiency 
calculations. 
D.  Determining the Appropriate Discount Rate. 
Some of the impacts of a policy will occur immediately, but other impacts 
will not occur for some period of time.  This raises the difficult question of how to 
aggregate the different benefit and cost impacts of a policy that occur during 
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different time periods into a single bottom line figure.  The standard approach 
taken in efficiency analysis is to discount all future impacts to a smaller present 
value before aggregation in a manner similar to what is done in conventional 
finance calculations of the present value of streams of future cash flow.  Use of this 
procedure then presents the question as to what is the appropriate discount rate that 
should be used. 
 Ideally the benefits or costs borne by each person impacted by a policy in 
each future time period would be discounted by the impacted person’s personal 
rate of time preference with regard to events occurring in that future period as 
compared to the current time period.  Once again, sampling limitations will 
generally preclude such an individualized assessment and use of personal discount 
rates, and the usual convention in efficiency analysis is to use a single discount rate 
for discounting all future impacts of a policy to a commensurate present value.  
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The chosen discount rate usually reflects either the analyst’s estimate of the 
average rate of time preference of the entire affected population over the relevant 
time periods, or instead is some bond market-based interest rate(s) paid in the 
market for long-run riskless investments over the relevant time period, such as the 
interest rate(s) on long-term US Treasury bonds of the appropriate maturity, or 
instead some estimate of the average annual rate of return on private invested 
capital over the relevant time period, or some combination of more than one of the 
above measures.  In addition, there is controversy regarding whether such finance-
theory based discount rates are appropriate for valuing very long-term 
consequences that even if quite large in magnitude when they occur will be 
reduced to insignificance by even a low discount rate, and what discount rate is 
appropriate when the cost impacts being valued are of the nature of loss of human 
life rather than merely financial consequences.      
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The lack of clear agreement as to what discount rates should be used in 
efficiency analysis presents a significant problem, because the assessment of 
policies that have substantial long-term impacts (which as I will discuss below 
includes all policies whatsoever because of their inevitable and universal genetic 
person-altering consequences) is very sensitive to the discount rates used to 
discount future impacts before aggregating them with current impacts.
13
  The 
sensitivity of the results reached in many analyses to an analyst’s relatively 
unconstrained choice of a discount rate serves to undercut the objective 
significance of the conclusions.         
E.  Valuing Policy Impacts When Preferences are Endogenous. 
A common assumption made in efficiency analysis is that people’s 
preference structures are exogenous with regard to the impact of policies.  In other 
words, it is assumed that they will value the impacts of a policy at the same amount 
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whether they express their willingness to pay either before or instead after they 
experience the policy’s impacts.  But this may not actually be the case, for a couple 
of reasons. 
First of all, behavioral economists have established that in many instances 
people exhibit an “endowment effect” where they will value a good or service that 
they own more than they would value that same good or service if they did not yet 
own it, even if their underlying preference structures with regard to that good or 
service remain essentially unchanged after they take ownership.  In such instances 
the aggregate willingness to pay for the benefits of a policy will vary depending on 
when that willingness to pay is expressed. 
Secondly, and more troubling as a conceptual matter, it is possible that the 
implementation of a policy may significantly alter the preference structures of 
some of the people affected, perhaps dramatically so.  Stated in a more technical 
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manner, preferences may be endogenous to a significant extent with regard to the 
policy under consideration.  If this is the case it presents the question of whether an 
analyst attempting to ascertain the efficiency or inefficiency of the policy should 
determine the impacted persons’ willingness to pay on the basis of their pre-policy 
implementation preference structures, or instead on the basis of their different post-
policy implementation preference structures?  In some instances the use of pre-
policy implementation preference structures as the valuation baseline would seem 
to be more appropriate,
14
  but in other instances the post-policy implementation 
preference structures would appear to be more appropriate.
15
  It is unclear what is 
the proper way to address this problem, as a general matter, and this lack of clarity 
creates yet another opportunity for a result-oriented analyst to manipulate the 




G. Valuing Policy Impacts in Light of the Person-Altering Consequences                            
 Policies. 
The noted British philosopher Derek Parfit has elaborated upon what he 
refers to as the “non-identity problem.”16 This is a strikingly novel insight of great 
(and in my opinion under-appreciated) significance for policy assessment.  I have 
relabeled this problem with what I regard as a more apt moniker as the “problem of 
person-altering consequences” in several articles that I have addressed in recent 
years to economists and lawyers and other policy analysts, rather than to the 
professional philosophers that were Parfit’s target audience.17   
This problem results from the fact that even a policy with very minor social 
impacts will surely have enough effect on some human comings and goings to at 
least slightly alter the details of at least one act of human reproduction so that the 
female’s egg is fertilized by a different male sperm, out of the hundreds of millions 
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of sperm released in an ejaculation, than the sperm that would have succeeded in 
fertilizing the egg had the precise timing or other details of the act of conception 
not been slightly altered by the policy.  This different sperm-egg fertilization will 
lead to a person being conceived and later born with a different genetic identity 
than would otherwise have been the case.  In other words, now a different person 
will eventually be born.  And as this genetically different person matures and goes 
through life they will surely affect other persons in ways that are different, perhaps 
radically so, than would have been the case had the policy not been implemented 
and the other “potential” person had been conceived and born instead.  These 
effects from a genetically different person going through their life will also surely 
alter some later acts of conception from what they otherwise would have been in a 
similar fashion over time, leading to an exponentially growing cascade of genetic 
alterations stemming from the initial policy impact.  After some period of time that 
is likely measured in mere decades rather than centuries the entire human 
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population conceived and born for the rest of eternity will all have different genetic 
identities than the future population that would have been born had the initial 
policy in question not been implemented.  The policy will therefore eventually 
have universal person-altering consequences.   
Another way to put this fascinating though somewhat troubling insight is 
that to note that one result of any policy whatsoever, even one with very minor 
initial impacts, will be to eventually create a future human population extending 
for eternity thereafter for whom that policy is a necessary condition of their 
existence.  None of the members of that population would have been conceived 
and born had the policy not been implemented.  This fact creates a real dilemma 
for attempts to estimate the willingness to pay for the policy’s benefit and cost 
impacts of the many members of that eternal parade of future generations.   
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One would expect these future persons to each place a very high positive 
value on a policy whose effects were a necessary condition of their existence, 
certainly if asking price measures are utilized, but likely very high even if offer 
prices are aggregated, even if the policy in other ways had adverse effects on their 
lives.
18
  These untold billions or perhaps even trillions of persons in the aggregate 
would surely place an astronomically high value on the policy that resulted in their 
existence, even if some of the other consequences of that policy were adverse to 
their interests.  Even if those future valuations are heavily discounted to a current 
present value the aggregate benefits are still likely to be massive (although 
obviously impossible of precise estimation), very likely large enough to greatly 
outweigh any negative policy impacts upon members of the current generation.  In 
other words, any policy option whatsoever, including the null option of doing 
nothing, will result in massive net benefits of uncertain magnitude because of the 
particular very large future population that the policy will bring into existence, 
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regardless of any negative impacts upon the current population.  This fact will 
render efficiency assessments rather useless for distinguishing among alternative 
policy options, and policymakers are of course likely to reject out of hand any 
evaluation method that essentially ignores policy impacts upon existing persons. 
So what can be done here to salvage the usefulness of economic efficiency 
as an evaluative standard, given this seemingly insuperable difficulty?  Analyses of 
the efficiency of policies are now invariably conducted on the basis of the 
demonstrably false implicit assumption that the same future persons will come into 
being whether or not the policy under consideration is implemented.  With this 
facilitating assumption the policy impacts on the wealth of future persons are then 
assessed against the hypothetical baseline alternative of those same future persons 
coming into being but not experiencing the policy’s impacts, which could then lead 
to either positive or negative estimated valuations of the policy impacts for each of 
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those many future persons, depending on the nature of those individual impacts.  
Those impacts are then all discounted to present values for aggregation with the 
impacts upon current persons.   
I want to emphasize that this working assumption that the same future 
persons will come into existence whether or not the policy in question is 
implemented is not merely a standard simplifying assumption that has been chosen 
in order to make otherwise difficult calculations somewhat more tractable without 
changing their basic character.  This is instead the far more dubious use of a 
hypothetical counterfactual baseline for assessing policy impacts that cannot 
possibly occur, since it is beyond reasonable argument that any policy will have 
the dramatic person-altering consequences that I have described that will 
eventually create an entirely different future population.  Those many efficiency 
analyses that simply assume away the problem of person-altering consequences by 
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pretending in this way that it does not exist are unfortunately not relevant to the 
real choices at hand between policy options all of which do have these person-
altering consequences. 
I see no way to incorporate person-altering consequences into efficiency 
analysis without leading to the counterintuitive and unhelpful but seemingly 
unavoidable result that massive but practically unquantifiable benefits will result 
for future generations that dwarf any impacts upon existing persons no matter what 
policies we pursue, since those future persons that will eventually come into being 
after any policy has been  implemented will be created in part by that policy, and 
would therefore likely deem this particular policy impact to be of overriding 
beneficial significance.  Even if the numerous other conceptual and empirical 
problems of the efficiency criterion that I have discussed above can somehow be 
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resolved I believe that the problem posed for efficiency analysis by person-altering 
consequences is likely fatal.   
Given this problem it appears to be necessary to develop alternative 
evaluative criteria to economic efficiency that do not require valuing policy 
impacts upon specific future persons.  Trying to think outside of the box here, one 
possible approach may be to simply assume that the massive benefits of uncertain 
magnitude for future persons that will result from any policy because of its person-
altering consequences will in effect “cancel out” when comparing alternative 
policies, including the null option of not implementing any policy, and therefore 
only the impacts upon current persons need to be considered and compared in 
policy assessment.  This approach would make policy assessment far more 
tractable.  However, the approach appears to be unsatisfactory in that it would 





 and unduly disfavor policies with current costs and large long-
term benefits for future persons.
20
  Effectively ignoring policy consequences for 
future persons in this manner  does not appear to be any more credible then 
pretending that policies do not have person-altering consequences.   
Another and more radical possible approach would be to try to develop 
evaluative criteria that focus instead on somehow valuing policy impacts upon the 
overall “human race” when it is viewed as a distinct entity that exists apart from 
the specific individuals that comprise it.  It is unclear, however, what sorts of 
policy impacts upon this “human race” would be considered that are not simply 
aggregations of the impacts on individual persons, nor how those impacts would be 
quantified.  Another even more radical tact might be to abandon consequentialist 
approaches and try to develop evaluative criteria that are based upon a non-
consequentialist assessment of the merits of the goals being pursued by the policy 
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architects, rather than assessing the policy consequences for individual human 
beings.  But should we really ignore consequences in evaluating policies?  Or we 
could perhaps even embrace criteria that are more explicitly theological in nature 
and that do not rest upon either the intentions of the actors or the policy impacts 
upon human welfare, but only upon their congruence with God’s grand plan?  But 
is there any chance that we would be able to reach even a rough consensus on 
which theological premises are most accurate?     
Determining how to take person-altering consequences into account in 
policy assessment is a very difficult question, and I concede that I do not have the 
answers at hand.  But it is clear to me that simply ignoring the problem this poses 
for efficiency analyses by making a demonstrably false assumption as to the 
invariability of the genetic identity of future persons with regard to policy impacts 
is not a viable approach.  This interesting and difficult conundrum should to be 
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made clear to students as part of their immersion in efficiency analysis.  I have 
found that my students find the problem of person-altering consequences to be 
quite interesting, and they are quickly able to grasp its great significance for 
undercutting the usefulness of conventional efficiency analysis.  
                       
IV. NORMATIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
CRITERION 
 Even if one is somehow able to overcome (or chooses to ignore) all of the 
above-discussed measurement and conceptual difficulties in order to obtain a 
meaningful estimate of the aggregate willingness to pay-based impacts of a policy, 
there is still the fundamental question presented regarding whether economic 
efficiency is an appropriate normative criterion for assessing the merits of that 
policy.  There are two major concerns here that deserve discussion in a Law and 
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Economics class, and that are fortunately relatively easy to convey to students in a 
succinct manner. 
First of all, a person’s willingness to pay to experience (or to avoid) the 
consequences of a policy are obviously not only a function of that person’s 
preferences but also a function of that person’s wealth.  The efficiency criterion 
can be succinctly described as a “one dollar, one vote” aggregate decision 
criterion.  It is definitely not the more democratic “one person, one vote” criterion, 
and the efficiency criterion systematically gives more weight to the preferences of 
more affluent persons in proportion to their relative wealth in policy assessment.   
One can argue that the amount of an individual’s wealth is positively 
correlated with productivity and with other socially desirable traits, at least to some 
substantial extent, and that this fact provides some social justification for giving 
greater weight in policy assessments to the preferences of more wealthy 
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individuals in order to provide incentives to people to further develop those 
desirable personal traits.  But the modest degree of correlation between wealth and 
virtue obviously allows for many exceptions.  Many individuals are wealthy 
through inheritance or good fortune without necessarily being productive or 
otherwise virtuous (anyone prominent come to mind here?), and other people are 
productive and/or otherwise virtuous yet poor, and so arguments can easily be 
made that would cut the other way against giving such overriding weight to 
relative wealth differentials in making social decisions.  It is clearly a matter for 
ongoing and perhaps ultimately unresolvable debate as to whether a willingness to 
pay-based decision-making criterion is more appropriate, all things considered, 
than would be the more democratic alternative of giving equal weight to the 
preferences of each person, or than would be, as another example, the alternative 
of adopting a utilitarian-type criterion that focused more directly upon the relative 
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psychological impacts of a policy upon different persons apart from their relative 
wealth.    
There is a sophisticated welfare economics literature that is not usually 
assigned in Law and Economics courses that makes clear that there are a large 
number of possible alternative “social welfare functions” that can be used to 
aggregate the impacts on different persons of a policy in order to evaluate its 
consequences.
21
  The willingness to pay-based algorithm is only one of many 
possible valuation yardsticks, and one with no special justification other than the 
fact that it closely parallels how the market prices for goods or services are set in 
competitive markets.  The inherent arbitrariness of the choice of the economic 
efficiency criterion as an evaluative standard can be easily communicated to law 
students in a clear and non-technical manner.      
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Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, there are no “rights” inherent 
in an efficiency calculation that need be respected.  If a person’s willingness to 
pay-based assessment of the costs that a policy imposes upon them is exceeded by 
the net aggregate benefits conferred on the other impacted persons, then the 
efficiency criterion will still endorse that policy no matter what the size or nature 
of the costs that are imposed upon that unfortunate person.  The use of an 
evaluative criterion that does not recognize any rights except the right to vote to 
the limit of one’s willingness to pay obviously co-exists uneasily with the 
fundamental values of our larger social and political system that is based on a 
Constitution that clearly embraces the idea of inalienable rights that are not to be 
infringed upon regardless of benefits thereby conferred upon other persons, 
especially if willingness to pay is measured by necessarily constrained offer prices 




Some commentators have criticized the Law and Economics courses offered 
in law schools as often being biased in favor of influencing students to uncritically 
apply the evaluative criterion of economic efficiency in policy analysis  despite its 
conceptual and empirical shortcomings, and despite the fact that it privileges the 
interests of the wealthy and disregards rights.  There is merit to these criticisms, 
and to some extent the introduction of these courses into law school curricula has 
been facilitated by funding provided by very wealthy persons who hoped to further 
institutionalize these normative biases within the legal community.  But I do not 
believe that we need to throw out the beautiful baby of the valuable analytical tools 
and perspectives developed by economists in order to rid ourselves of the dirty 
bathwater of a poorly defined and ideologically biased efficiency criterion.   
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It is entirely possible for a teacher of this course to convey to their students 
an appreciation of the substantial conceptual and empirical difficulties involved in 
quantifying the efficiency consequences of a policy.  It is certainly relatively easy 
to bring to the students’ attention the rather obvious normative concerns raised by 
the use of a “one dollar, one vote” efficiency criterion that in addition does not 
recognize any limitations based upon rights.   If these crippling shortcomings of 
efficiency analysis are effectively communicated then I believe that the bias of 
many Law and Economics courses in favor of the interests of the wealthy and 
against the consideration of rights that is often decried by critics will be eliminated.  
Students who are made aware of the limitations of the economic efficiency 
criterion that I have here described will hopefully be able to counter policy 
arguments that are based on an efficiency premise, and will understand the need to 
disregard or at least supplement efficiency assessments of policies with the 
application of other evaluative standards.  
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